America Takes Over
An exchange of letters between Ben Gurion (BG) and Eisenhower

April 10, 1956 By April 1956, regular egyptian forces were taking part in border raids against Israel. President Eisenhower sought to deter Israel from retaliation, even in the face of extreme provocation. Excerpts from Eisenhower's letter and BG's reply follow: I realize that this is a very tense time, and additional provocative acts are possible from irregular forces. I sincerely hope that in view of the terrible tragedy that general hostile actions will undoubtedly bring to this region you will abstain, even under the pressure of extreme provocation, from any retaliatory acts which may result in very dangerous consequences. In his reply to Eisenhower, BG wrote in part: During the past three nights, the egyptian authorities sent gangs of murderers from gaza to murder innocent citizens, to destroy installations, and to spread fear among peaceful villagers. united nations observers recognized the responsibility of the egyptian authorities. I am certain that if the entire situation were detailed for you, you would not have restricted yourself merely to expressing hope that we would abstain from military acts. I cannot imagine that in the case of continual egyptian attacks you would assume that we would abandon our country and people to the dangers and bloody consequences of a perpetual campaign of terror by the terrorist gangs of the egyptian government. I am certain that no other country would surrender to such a situation without appropriate action. The Government of Israel and I are fully aware of your sincere White House declaration that the United States will oppose any attack in the region. However, I would not be candid with you nor would I be fulfilling my obligation to my people were I not to say in all friendliness that such a declaration does not relieve our grave anxiety for Israel's security.

October 31, 1956 Part of the conflict involved egypt's nationalization of the Suez Canal, that was owned by British and French stockholders. France and Britain sided with Israel as a means to regain control of the Suez Canal and possibly overthrow the nasser regime. America saw this pact as a threat to its world supremacy, since it was made without America's authority. Hence Eisenhower's message to BG during the Suez Campaign: Despite the present, temporary interests that Israel has in common with France and Britain, you ought not to forget that the strength of Israel and her future are bound up with the United States.

November 7, 1956 In the morning hours of November 5, 1956, Israel occupied the last egyptian stronghold in Sinai, Sharm el-Sheikh, and thus completed the military operations begun on October 29. On that day, the secretary-general submitted a plan for a united nations emergency force (unef). This led to the un resolution 1000, which was passed by the general assembly with 57 votes for, none against, and 19 abstentions. Then, on Novemeber 7, un resolution 1001 passed, which defined the scope of activities for the unef (forces), established an advisory committee, and asked the commander of the force to organize its size and composition. The voting was 64 for, none against, and 12 abstentions. Consequently, Eisenhower delivered a sort ultimatum to BG, urging Israel to withdraw from Sinai: As you know, the general assembly of the united nations has arranged a cease-fire in egypt to which egypt, France, the United Kingdom, and Israel have agreed. There is being dispatched to egypt a united nations force in accordance with pertinent resolutions of the general assembly. That body has urged that all other foreign forces be withdrawn from egyptian territory, and specifically, that Israeli forces be withdrawn to the general armistice line. The resolution covering the cease-fire and withdrawal was introduced by the United States and received the overwhelming vote of the assembly... However, The terms of the cease-fire where not exactly favorable to Israel...On November 6, 1956, Britain and France announced that they would cease fire and withdraw from the Canal zone with no prior conditions. Israel had accepted the cease fire on November 3, insisting at the same time that prior arrangements be made regarding the freedom of navigation and relations with egypt in general before the Israeli forces were withdrawn. The general assembly, nevertheless, passed the cease-fire resolution, (resolution) 1002, with 65 votes for, 1 against, and 10 abstentions. The terms of the "cease-fire" were very simple; France and Britain were to withdraw from the Suez Canal and Israel was to withdraw to the armistice lines of 1949. Israel would not receive anything for "surrendering," yet the US and the un demanded that it surrender to the aggressor. Nonetheless, BG replied in compliance with Eisenhower's demands, saying, amongst other things: ...Your statement that a united nations force is being dispatched to egypt in accordance with pertinent resolutions of the general assembly is welcomed by us. We have never planned to annex the Sinai desert. In view of the united nations resolutions regarding the withdrawal of foreign troops from egypt and the creation of the international force, we will, upon conclusion of satisfactory arrangements with the united nations in connection with this international force entering the Suez Canal area, willingly withdraw our forces...

January 23, 1957 In a review of the political and military situation, BG explained why Israel was demanding real and effective guarantees from the un for the safeguarding of Israel's rights to navigate in the Suez Canal and the Straits of Eilat. He also dealt with the special position of the gaza strip. He said, amongst other things: ...The task of the international force when it was established by the assembly resolution of November 4, 1956 was defined as follows: "To secure and supervise the cessation of hostilities." We were entitled to expect that the un force would refrain from restoring the status quo in the Sinai desert, namely, its transformation into a base for aggression against Israel. We still maintain this demand, but we do not hold up the withdrawal on this ground. We have now evacuated the whole of the desert, an area of more than 50,000 square kilometres, with the exception of the narrow coastal strip of the Straits of Tiran which today assures freedom of navigation in the Gulf to all vessels without discrimination, including arab ships. We have no desire to remain in this strip, and it is our intention to evacuate it immediately upon receiving effective assurances against any interference with the freedom of Israeli and international shipping such as at present in fact obtains in this international waterway... ...The principle of free navigation both in the Straits of Tiran and in the Suez Canal has been wantonly trampled on by egypt for eight years. Particularly has this been so in the last three years. And egypt now publicly proclaims that it will continue thus to act in the future. The coast of the straits, like the greater part of the Sinai area, is a desolate desert, waterless and uninhabited, and until the boycott and blockade was organized by the arab league, no egyptian force was stationed in the Sharm el-Sheikh bay. Military forces were sent to the spot by the egyptian authorities to interfere with Israeli and international shipping to and from Eilat. This act of hostility was a violation of the un charter, the security council resolution, and the general armistice agreement; but it continued for years without the united nations taking any measures to stop it. Navigation in the Gulf of Eilat is vital for Israel and of great importance for international trade. As far back as 22 years ago, on 4 June 1935, I submitted to the late Justice Brandeis, of the U.S. Supreme Court, a memorandum on the importance of Eilat, which was the first Hebrew port in ancient times, in the days of Solomon, Jehoshaphat, and Uzziah, kings of Judah. "The Gulf," I wrote then, "played an important part in olden days, in Biblical times; in the near future Eilat will play a more important part, politically and economically, than it did in the period of the Bible. The Suez Canal, which has served as the central artery of the British Empire, can easily lose its importance. Sooner or later, Britain will leave egypt. The Suez Canal is too narrow for large modern ships, and it can easily be blocked in time of war. It is enough to sink one ship to block the Canal. There is no other route to India except through the Red Sea, from Haifa by way of Eilat. These two points, accordingly, assume great importance..." ...When we demand effective and substantial guarantees from the united nations to safeguard free passage for Israel and other nations in the Eilat Straits and the Red Sea, we do not abandon our right and our demand for freedom of navigation in the Suez Canal, and the united nations will be tested by its capacity to implement its decisions to prevent all overt or covert discrimination in Suez [Canal] navigation... ...Navigation in the Eilat Straits and the Red Sea will be safeguarded if the four countries situated on the coast of the Straits, Israel, jordan, saudi arabia, and egypt, sign a treaty safeguarding freedom of navigation for all ships without exception and without any interference, or if this is not yet practicable, if the united nations assembly will decide that the unef will assure freedom of passage and that it will not leave the coastal strip until a final settlement is arrived at between Israel and egypt, or until some special arrangement on freedom of navigation in the gulf is reached in agreement with Israel. And until then the Israel Defence Forces will continue to safeguard free navigation. And now I turn to the gaza problem. This Strip never belonged to egypt, Egypt held it for eight years as a reward for its invasion of this country, and throughout that time it did nothing to develop the area. As for the armistice agreement with egypt which was signed eight years ago (on February 24, 1949) as a transitional stage to a permanent peace, the egyptian dictator has violated its principles and purposes, and by his repeated declarations that there is a state of war between Israel and egypt, he has distorted the essence and the aims of the agreement. He has exploited it as a smokescreen to cover up his murderous attacks against the people of Israel and his implacable blockade of Israel on land, at sea, and in the air. It was from the gaza strip that the fidayun units were despatched to Israel, and bands of murderers and saboteurs were organized in other arab countries as well. Thus the agreement was transformed into a harmful and dangerous fiction, which only assisted the egyptian ruling junta in its malevolent designs. Any return to this agreement means a return to murder and sabotage. Israel does not claim that the absence of an armistice agreement means the existence of a state of war with egypt, even though egypt had insisted on the existence of a state of war even when the agreement was in existence. Israel is prepared to confirm its position on this by signing immediately with egypt an agreement of nonbelligerency and mutual non-aggression, but the armistice agreement, violated and broken, is beyond repair. The position in the gaza strip is unique, and no united nations force would by its very character be able to prevent the organization of fidayun by the egyptian authorities in this area, and their employment on Israeli territory. The entry of the un force into the Strip will result in a deterioration in the security position of the Israeli settlements along the Strip and, in fact, everywhere within Israel's limited area. At the same time the Strip would be cut off from all possibility of economic development, and the refugees would once again be abandoned to egyptian incitement, which would be reintroduced directly or indirectly... ...Israel is well aware of the problem of the refugees in gaza, which is part of the problem of the arab refugees in general. There is perhaps no sphere in which the moral failure of the arab states has been so clear in the last eight years as this sphere of their attitude to the arab refugees. While Israel has absorbed within a small, impoverished, and devastated country, hundreds of thousands of refugees, half of them remnants of the victims of the nazis and half Jewish refugees from arab countries, the arab countries, including some possessing extensive and sparsely populated territories, have refused to settle the arab refugees, so that they might exploit them as a political weapon against Israel... ...The restoration of egyptian influence--directly by a return of the egyptian army, or indirectly upon the entry of the unef--is likely to block and eliminate all constructive prospects, and the Strip would revert to lawlessness, to its own misfortune and that of all the adjacent areas...

February 20, 1957 A number of resolutions passed by the general assembly called upon Israel to complete its withdrawal from Sinai and the gaza strip. Among them were resolution 1120 of November 24, 1956, and resolution 1123 of January 19, 1957. On February 2, 1957, another resolution (resolution 1124) was passed by 74 votes for, 2 against, with 2 abstentions. None of the resolutions made any reference to freedom of navigation or the future of the gaza strip. Nonetheless, on February 20, Eisenhower threatened Israel with sanctions in a broadcast to the American people. Excerpts follow: ...The Prime Minister of Israel, in answer to a personal communication, assured me early in November that Israel would willingly withdraw its forces if and when there should be created a united nations force to move into the Suez Canal area. This force was, in fact, created and has moved into the Canal area. Subsequently, Israeli forces were withdrawn from much of the territory of egypt which they had occupied. However, Israeli forces still remain outside the armistice lines. They are at the mouth of the Gulf of Eilat, which is about 100 miles from the nearest Israeli territory. They are also in the gaza strip, which, by the [1949] armistice agreement, was to be occupied by egypt. These facts create the present crisis... ...Repeated, but, so far, unsuccessful, efforts have been made to bring about a voluntary withdrawal by Israel. These efforts have been made both by the united nations and by the United States and other member-States. Equally serious efforts have been made to bring about conditions designed to assure that, if Israel will withdraw in response to the repeated requests of the united nations, there will then be achieved a greater security and tranquillity for that nation... ...The united nations general assembly on February 2, by an overwhelming vote, adopted a pertinent resolution. It was to the effect that, after full withdrawal of Israel from the Gulf of Eilat and gaza areas, the united nations emergency force should be placed on the egyptian-Israeli armistice lines to assure the scrupulous maintenance of the [1949] armistice agreement... ...However, the Prime Minister [of Israel], in his reply, took the position that Israel would not evacuate its military forces from the gaza strip unless Israel retained the civil administration and police. This would be in contradiction to the [1949] armistice agreement. Also, the reply said that Israel would not withdraw from the Straits of Eilat unless freedom of passage through the straits was assured... ...The Government of Israel has not yet accepted, as adequate insurance of its own safety after withdrawal, the far-reaching united nations resolution of February 2, plus the important declaration of United States policy made by our secretary of state on February 11. Israel seeks something more. It insists on firm guarantees as a condition to withdrawing its forces... ...[But] The united nations must not fail. I believe that in the interests of peace the united nations has no choice but to exert pressure upon Israel to comply with the withdrawal resolutions. Of course, we still hope that the Government of Israel will see that its best immediate and long-term interests lie in compliance with the united nations and in declarations of the United States with reference to the future...

February 21, 1957 On February 21, 1957, BG informed Eisenhower that Ambassador Eban would return to the United States on February 22 and bring with him the decision of the Israeli Government. On that same day BG addressed the Knesset. Israel had, in early February, sought to separate the future of gaza from the issue of freedom of navigation in the Straits of Tiran. While there was agreement between Israel and the United States over the latter point, there was none over the fate of the gaza strip. Meanwhile, Israel had tried to postpone the debate in the united nations to the end of February but postponement was opposed by secretary-general hammarskjold. An excerpt from Prime Minister BG's speech follows: Mr. Chairman, honoured Knesset members, fate has decreed that our small and young State should become involved in a grave controversy with two world factors which perhaps no State in the world appreciates more than Israel, namely, the united nations and the United States. The controversy is over a decisive moral question in international relations whether the united nations, with the aid of the United States, shall apply different standards of justice, one for dictatorial egypt and one for democratic Israel; whether those who desire to destroy us shall be allowed to disregard every international undertaking and promise, violate the un charter and the resolutions of the un general assembly and the security council, send murderers and saboteurs into our country, and impose an economic siege, boycott, and blockade on us while Israel is not allowed to defend itself or to protect its rights, sovereign equality, and security; whether the united nations with the aid of the United States shall impose sanctions on us because we do not accept the double moral standard of the egyptian dictator who demands that others fulfill everything that benefits him while he violates every bilateral agreement and international obligation which benefits others. Will the united nations and the United States give their blessing to this regime of outrageous and flagrant discrimination in international relations? This is the bitter question which is now being asked not only in our country but throughout the entire world, which, like us, is not willing to accept the rule that might is right. Every attempt to impose on us perverted justice and a regime of discrimination will encounter unshrinking opposition from the Israeli people. If there is not one law and one standard of justice for all nations in the united nations, then its moral basis will be destroyed...

March 2, 1957 Israel agreed to withdraw to the 1949 armistice lines. Thereafter, on March 2, 1957, Eisenhower sent a letter to BG expressing his friendship (the friendship of America) and his hopes for the future. President Eisenhower had good reason to be happy, as Israel had done everything he asked. It's important to note though, that Eisenhower and America were not worried for the safety of Israel or the goodness of the world. Had this been the issue, Israel would not have been "forced" to back down to a dictator and submit itself to injustice. America was not worried about Justice; to the contrary, it was worried about its own interests. America was busy playing its cold war games, and the Soviets had found themselves an ally in egypt. But when egypt was defeated, the Russians offered to help them defeat (and thus destroy) Israel, and drive out the French and the British. Of course this was just a threat and the Russians made no attempts to even mobilize their troops, especially since they were busy suppressing an uprising in Hungary, but the Americans used this as an excuse, in defense of their "peace-keeping" policy. The truth is, America is interested in peace only as long as it is the one maintaining the "peace," the one maintaining the order, and thus the one that gives the orders and controls the region. America lost control of egypt because it refused to finance the nasser regime, and then the USSR stepped in, financing, supporting, and backing the egyptians. But with Israel in control, America lost control of the middle east, and thus the Russians were "strengthened." Therefore Eisenhower issued a new policy, known as the Eisenhower Doctrine, offering support and monetary aid to arab countries, most of which were being armed by their Russian "allies." Thus America pressured France and Britain to abandon their interests and withdraw from egypt, and it urged and threatened Israel to back down and abandon its security, since this would give America a better opportunity to re-establish its authority. And nothing has changed, especially today, when America reigns supreme.

March 8, 1957 In reply to Eisenhower's letter of March 2, BG again expressed Israel's hopes that the arrangements agreed upon would be carried out. Excerpts follow: Now that we have withdrawn from the Sinai desert, as I promised in my letter of 8 November, and have also withdrawn from the gaza strip, which I profoundly believe we should not have done for both political and security reasons, please permit me to point out that we did so in large measure because of your letter of 2 March in which you expressed your conviction that "Israel would have no reason to regret" such an action and that the "hopes and expectations" expressed by its Foreign Minister "would not prove groundless." I must tell you how much we appreciate the continuation and deepening of US-Israeli friendship, and how greatly all of us, and myself in particular, value your noble and moral personality. I must explain to you why it was difficult for us, as you acknowledged in your letter, to evacuate the gaza strip. During the last few months the inhabitants of our villages in the South and the Negev could, for the first time in eight years, live in peace, knowing that grenades would not be thrown into their homes at night, and that they would not be ambushed on their way to work in the fields during the day. These pioneers, our finest youth, have left well-to-do families in Haifa and Tel Aviv, interrupted their education, and gone to settle in the border areas, risking their lives in order to populate the wilderness. You will therefore understand why, since yesterday, our hearts have been heavy and our villagers have been uneasy. We are particularly concerned at the fact that the secretary-general, basing himself on his own formalistic interpretations, may try to bring the egyptians back to the gaza strip, a place which never belonged to them. But we put our trust in the attitude expressed in your letter, and in your assurance that our Foreign Minister's hopes and expectations will not prove groundless.

March 13 & 16, 1957 The re-entry of egyptian forces into the gaza strip violated the arrangements agreed upon and was the subject of an exchange of letters between the Prime Minister of Israel and the President of the United States, excerpts of which follow: Ben-Gurion to Eisenhower March 13, 1957 If immediate and effective steps are not taken to ensure, in the words of secretary Dulles, the "de facto exclusion" of the egyptians from the strip, and to halt the regression to the status quo ante of tension, violence, and blockade, I fear that the area will once more be cast into the throes of a most grave crisis. It is my fervent hope that Israel will not have to make use of its right of self-defense, as we announced in the general assembly of the united nations on March 1, that we might have to do under certain circumstances, and as was noted by the United States and other governments. Mr. President, I place my reliance on your assurance that we shall have no cause to regret our withdrawal. Eisenhower replies to Ben-Gurion March 16, 1957 The United States has made clear its hopes with respect to the situation which should prevail following the Israeli withdrawal. We shall continue to strive to see to it that these hopes materialize. It is, of course, obvious that this will involve many difficulties and will raise questions which the United States alone cannot decide. The problems with which we are confronted have been for a long time in the making, and patience and forbearance are required in our task of seeking a solution to them. I am sure you will agree that it is of the utmost importance that the greatest restraint be exercised by all concerned and that there be avoided any precipitate action which might result in a deterioration of the situation and a risk of undoing all that has been accomplished.